6.0

COMMISSION’S OBSERVATION AND ANALYSIS OF LICENSEE’S PROPOSAL
On detailed scrutiny and examination of the RST application for the FY 2001-02 and the revenue requirement application for the FY 2002-03 along with clarifications submitted by the licensee before the Commission, the written and oral submissions of the objectors and the views of the Members of the Commission Advisory Committee, the Commission has passed the order, as detailed below.

6.1

Scenario of the Power Sector Reform in Orissa

6.1.1

All the distribution licensees have made a strong plea that the sectoral survival is possible in the present Orissa situation only when the input cost of power purchase is brought down by reducing the bulk supply tariff charged by GRIDCO to the DISTCOs.

6.1.2

The State of Orissa was the first to initiate power reform in the country. The Orissa Electricity Reform Act, 1995 was put into the statute with a view to restructure the electricity industry in the state and rationalize the generation, transmission, distribution and supply of electricity and to create avenues for participation of private sector entrepreneurs and create infrastructure for development and management of electricity industry in an efficient, economic and competitive manner. Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission has been constituted under the Act for overseeing and regulating the affairs of electricity industry in the State including rationalisation/setting of tariff.

6.2

Restructuring of the Power Sector

6.2.1

Prior to coming into force of the OER Act, 1995 on 01.4.96, the Thermal Station at Talcher of 460 MW capacity owned by OSEB was sold to NTPC in June, 1995 at a consideration of Rs.356.00 Crore.

6.2.2

The OSEB was dissolved and unbundled with the take over of hydro stations owned by the OSEB and the Government by the Orissa Hydro Power Corporation and its transmission and distribution business was taken over by GRIDCO with effect from 1st April 1996.Thereafter, the distribution and retail supply of electricity was vested in four distribution companies initially as wholly owned subsidiary companies of GRIDCO. Three of these distribution companies were privatised on 1st April 1999 and the fourth one on 1st September 1999 after disinvestment of its 51% share. The state owned Orissa Power Generation Corporation created in 1984 continued to operate as a separate entity and managed the Ib Thermal Power Station of capacity 420 MW near Jharsuguda.

6.2.3

The assets of the erstwhile OSEB including those of the hydro generating stations were taken over by the State Government, revalued and transferred to GRIDCO and OHPC. The upvalued amount was adjusted in favour of the state Government through grant of equity share and issue of bonds bearing no interest with a moratorium period of five years with provision of subsequent conversion in phases into equity and issue of debentures bearing interest. Revaluation of assets was considered to enable the Government of Orissa to realize more realistic value for its past investment at the time of privatization and also enhance the creditworthiness of the utilities. The revaluation was based on the revenue earning potential and was intended as a means of raising revenue through higher level of depreciation, higher operation and maintenance cost, higher return on equity for smooth functioning of the power sector. To sum up the revaluation was also done with the objective of eliminating GRIDCO’s and OHPC’s dependence on budgetary support from Government of Orissa.

6.2.4

The process of reform and restructuring paved the way for commitment of World Bank loan of 350 US million dollars for long term capital investment in the power sector in Orissa along with 65 million sterling pound funding from the DFID to meet urgent needs of repair & maintenance expenses and consultancy support. The World Bank also prepared a report known at the Staff Appraisal Report in April 1996 on the Orissa Power Sector Restructuring Project and made financial projections based on certain assumptions of power purchase, power sale, level of transmission and distribution loss, collection efficiency and operating expenses which envisaged that GRIDCO after meeting all costs will turn around from FY 1997-98 onwards. There was no provision of transitional support whatsoever during this period. On the contrary, State Government adjusted a sum of Rs.340.2 Crore payable to GRIDCO against the upvaluation. All the liabilities of erstwhile OSEB were also passed on to GRIDCO based on the above financial analysis and projections.

6.2.5

In reality, the projections did not materialize as envisaged the financial health of GRIDCO is far from satisfactory as the accumulated losses of GRIDCO has increased to Rs.1197 Crore by the year FY 1998-99 and is likely to be upto Rs.1378 Crore by 2001-02. It faces acute liquidity problem as the DISTCOs have paid to GRIDCO towards purchase of power only about 65.21% of BST bills upto FY 2001 and 46.42% upto December 2001.

6.2.6

However, in the post-reform period from 1 April, 1996 to 31 March, 2001, the state generators, namely, OPGC and OHPC have earned profit of Rs.768 Crore in books which should have made them financially viable but in reality, OHPC is faced with cash crunch due to non-payment of its energy dues by GRIDCO.

6.2.7

Private capital has been infused in the form of disinvestment of 49% of equity shares of OPGC (Rs.603 Crore), sale of 51% share of distribution business of GRIDCO (Rs.159 Crore).

6.2.8

In OSEB days, the State Government was required to provide necessary subvention under Section 59 of the Supply Act 1948 so as to leave a surplus of not less than 3% to OSEB after meeting all expenses properly chargeable to revenue including O&M and management expenses, taxes, depreciation and interest etc. for sustenance of the power sector to meet its socio-economic obligations of giving power supply to the vulnerable sections of the society but in the post-reform era, the Government of Orissa has totally divested itself from the burden of such payment which on a rough estimate would have come to Rs.2770 Crore had the OSEB continued as an entity.

6.2.9

The Commission reiterates its observation made in the order dt.19.01.2001 that payment of subsidies are not in consonance with the spirit of the Reform Act, 1995 but the State Government’s financial back-up in the form of subvention or subsidy during the transitional period could have substantially eased the situation as has been realised and is being implemented in many reforming States like Andhra Pradesh (Rs.1585 crore), Gujarat (Rs.1260 crore), Uttar Pradesh (Rs.790 crore), Haryana (Rs.769.3 crore for one year) and Rajasthan (Rs.3496.6 crore in four years), Delhi (@ Rs.500 crore per annum for five years). This was necessary because the social policies, such as, Rural Electrification, Lift Irrigation, Kutir Jyoti carried out at the behest of the State as a matter of state policy for the benefit of a larger section of the state’s population was continued in the post-reform period and also tariff can not be made cost reflective in one go, as it would generate a price shock to consumers.

6.2.10

The single most important factor that raised the revenue requirement of all the licensees in the post-reform era was the substantial rise in the cost of hydro power as well as in the cost of transmission and distribution on account of revaluation of assets as on 01.4.96 and also providing an accelerated rate of depreciation. Further, in the pre-reform era, power requirement of the state was met mostly from sources within the State and limited procurement from Central Generating Stations and CPPs. However, with the passage of time, the State became more dependent on drawal of power from the Central Generating Station due to delayed commissioning of the Upper Indravati Hydro Electric Project. The NTPC power remained costlier as their power stations in the eastern regions were new stations and continued to operate at low PLF accentuating the fixed cost per unit. On the revenue side, the single most important factor has been the lack of growth in EHT and HT loads as envisaged.

6.2.11

The forecast of consistent reduction in transmission and distribution loss from an estimated level of 39.5% for the FY 1996-97 to 22.7% by the FY 2000-01 has not worked out. Even the initial assessment of loss as 39.5% for the FY 1996-97 turned out to be 49.4% as revealed from the audit report during the corresponding year.

6.2.12

The transmission and distribution sector continued to bear further financial liabilities due to interest burden on account of debt servicing of past loans & liabilities and large scale investment in transmission and distribution for improvement of quality of power supply without corresponding rise in sale of power.

6.2.13

The anticipation that the impact of revaluation of assets would be offset with the growth of EHT and HT loads has not worked as the expected load growth like installation of steel plant at Gopalpur, Duburi projected in pre-1996 era did not materialize coupled with recession in the industrial sector severely hurting the anticipated growth at HT & EHT. Further, to make the matters worse, the loads in the subsidised categories have increased. This has adversely affected the revenues of the utilities.

6.2.14

The actual sale of 2760 MU to the industrial HT & EHT bulk supply and railway in 2000-01 was far below the load projection of 7009 MU for these categories made in the Staff Appraisal Report which has seriously affected the revenue earning potential of the licensees, widened the gap between the cost of supply and revenue realisation and reduced the scope of cross-subsidy to low voltage classes of consumers.

6.2.15

Had the load projection contemplated in the Staff Appraisal Report materialized, the revenue position of the utilities would have been much better and it would have contributed to an overall reduction in T&D loss figure.

6.2.16

Some HT/EHT consumers preferred generation of power from their own Captive Power Plants rather than avail power from DISTCOs on cost consideration though the Eastern Zone continues to be surplus in generation.

6.2.17

Though collection efficiency is around 98% to 99% in privately managed utilities like CESC, Calcutta and BSES. Bombay, the DISTCOs in Orissa have achieved only 75% for 1999-00 and 76% for the year 2000-01. Their failure to collect the revenue at the tariff permitted by the Commission from year to year and to convert the lost units by regularizing unauthorized connection and reducing load have magnified the liquidity problem.

6.2.18

The affordability of a large section of consumers mostly from domestic, irrigation, small industrial segments, etc. constituting more than 90% of the total consumers strength happened to be the weakest link in attaining a cost based tariff structure, which in effect would result in reduction of Industrial Tariff and substantial increase in LT Tariff.

6.2.19

It was expected that a vibrant industrial sector would support and make the power sector self-sustaining for which no provision was kept to provide financial support to GRIDCO during the transition year though GRIDCO in its new incarnation was still required to undertake socially purposive but unremunerative measures such as Rural Electrification and supply to the rural poor. The state’s economy had received tremendous setback due to occurrence of natural calamities like super cyclone, drought and flood in succession affecting both the utilities and the consumers. Besides, the customer care of the distribution companies has left much to be desired raising questions on efficacy of privatisation.

6.2.20

It may be reiterated that the asset revaluation, absence of subvention from the Government, high level of transmission and distribution loss, non-maturing of HT & EHT loads, coupled with poor billing and collection of the distribution companies are the causes of imbalancing factors leading to the losses in the GRIDCO and distribution utilities.

6.2.21

Therefore, it is felt that a mid course correction of the Power Sector Reform in Orissa is urgently necessary to strengthen the power sector in the interest of the consumers, investors and the state’s economy.

6.2.22

From 01.04.2001 onwards, the moratorium period of five years allowed on the zero coupon bond issued to GRIDCO as well as the convertible bonds issued to OHPC was to expire by 31 March 2001 and its treatment like conversion of bond to equity and collection of interest on the balance portion of bond in accordance with the Government Notification, and realization of interest on loans allowed for completion of Upper Indravati and Potteru Hydro Electric Project would further aggravate the situation by substantially raising the revenue requirement for the licensees to meet the extra burden of interest costs. As disclosed from the revenue trend of last five years even without the impact of the servicing of those bonds, the licensees were neck deep in meeting their financial obligations and accretion of those new liabilities would add to the further woes of the sector.

6.2.23

With this scenario in view, the committee of independent experts (hereafter called the Kanungo Committee) appointed by the Government of Orissa have very aptly recommended, as a mid-course correction, certain measures setting aside the revaluation assets of OHPC, payment of interest to the State Government on the loans imposed on the licensees due to revaluation to provide requisite support to the power sector for its resuscitation and among other things have made the following significant recommendations :

• Revaluation of GRIDCO and OHPC assets to be kept in abeyance till the system is brought to balance.

• State Government to agree to allow moratorium on debt servicing to the State except the amounts in respect of loans from the World Bank.

• An interim financial package amounting to Rs.3240 Crore (estimated) to be availed from World Bank and the DFID to bridge the cash gap in order to keep the tariff at the same level for the period from 2001-02 to 2004-05.

• Instituting regular systems of monitoring of consumer grievances and services supplemented by test checks.

• Setting up of Rural Engineering Planning Organisation (REPO) and Rural Electrification Planning Units (REPU) under Government of Orissa to monitor RE and LI works.

• At this point of crisis, all agencies such as State Government, the Central Government, the World Bank and DFID should get together to rescue the reform process.

• Reduction of distribution loss @ 5% p.a. with a base level of 42.2% in the year 2001-02.

• Collection efficiency of DISTCOs to increase from 76% to 85% by 2004-05.
  

6.2.24

The inescapable conclusion emerges from the aforesaid observation is that support for sectoral revival can be possible with reduction in input cost to the distribution companies, which has occurred on account of exponential rise in (a) cost of power (b) cost of transmission (c) cost of distribution. The rise in power purchase cost has been more steep in respect of Orissa Hydro Power Corporation (old stations) where the per unit cost of power purchase went up from 22 paise/unit as on 31 March, 1996 to 38 paise/unit as on 1 April, 1996 and49 paise/unit between 1997-98 to 2000-01. GRIDCO has proposed to raise the cost of OHPC power to 72 paise/unit with effect from 1 April, 2001 as a result of expiry of the period of moratorium on Government loans.

6.3

Strategies for Improvement of Power Sector

6.3.1

Against this backdrop, the Commission deems it fit to have a review of the various policy options being followed in the post reform era in the best interest of the power sector in the state within the frame work of existing Act, Rules and Regulations. In fact, Commission in its tariff order and conceptual paper of August, 1998 had reserved the right to review those points at an appropriate time.

6.3.2

In course of the hearings, the utilities as well as some of the respondents spoke about the element of uncertainty and risk inherent in an annual tariff setting exercise and they pleaded for introduction of a multi-year tariff regime which would reduce such uncertainty. The Commission is conscious of the need for greater certainty in the regulatory treatment of a host of issues having direct impact on tariff setting. The Commission shall endeavour to set in motion a multi-year tariff principle regime effective from April, 2003 for FY 2003-04 after wide publicity and consultation with all the stakeholders. The Commission initiated preparation of a five-year sectoral plan covering generation, transmission and distribution which will provide key inputs to this exercise. The draft consultation document which is currently under finalisation will also be brought out to facilitate the process of such consultation and obtain comments from the various stakeholder.

6.3.3

The utilities have to improve upon their own performance within a stipulated time frame by upgrading their managerial skills and efficiency by scrupulously adhering to certain operational norms like reduction in the level of loss, attaining certain level of billing and collection efficiency, setting a target for investment and avoiding time and cost overrun in execution of projects, etc. This calls for not a single year target but fixing a target to be achieved over a control period to provide a kind of predictability to the consumers and to their own shareholders and to the Commission. The Commission considers it prudent and desirable to go for a multi-year tariff principle regime for which the utilities should conform themselves to a multi-year target setting in the areas stated above. The Commission also feel that the FY 2001-02 should be considered as the base year for all calculations as suggested by the Kanungo Committee.

6.3.4

It is also felt at this stage that steep hike in tariff would not be implementable. A reasonable level of tariff rise that prescribes a competitive tariff for the industrial and commercial enterprises coupled with rationalization of the tariff structure can help in growth of these categories. This calls for support to the transmission and distribution utility in the form of reduced cost input in the power purchase which can help in bringing about sectoral revival including improvement in quality of supply and service to the customer.

6.3.5

The options available are :-

• Suggest and adopt means for neutralization of the effect of asset revaluation

• For improvement of the liquidity of the licensee to examine the issue of securitisation of power purchase liability of GRIDCO in respect of long term bonds in consonance with the recommendations of Ahluwalia Committee.

• direct the utilities to commit to definite and unambiguous target like reduction of transmission and distribution loss in a time bound period.

• confirmation from the utilities for achieving certain minimum level of collection and billing from year to year.

• direct the utilities to bring in working capital to take up required repair and maintenance work.

• determination of revenue requirement based on the level of transmission and distribution loss, level of billing in collection in accordance with the parameters stated above.

6.3.6

The Commission considers the necessity of certain short-term measures for immediate implementation to reduce the revenue requirement of the utilities to contain the tariff rise at a reasonable level without affecting the financial viability of the Generators, GRIDCO and DISTCOs. The Commission, therefore, first would like to analyse the impact of revaluation of assets and explore means of neutralising its adverse effect in increasing the revenue requirement of the utilities.

6.3.7

It is an undisputed fact that the revaluation of assets of OHPC/GRIDCO has substantially raised cost of power from OHPC which in turn resulted in enhancement of GRIDCO’s cost of power procurement and the revenue requirement of the transmission and distribution business of GRIDCO and DISTCOs. At para 8.4 of order No.009 dt.12.03.1997 in case No.4 of 1997, revaluation of asset was dealt which is quoted below :-

“Objections with regard to reform, restructuring and steps for privatisation programme, and various facets of transfer scheme, revaluation of assets, etc. are beyond the scope of this Commission as these have been done either in consequence or through an Act of the legislature of which the Commission is a creature.”

6.3.8

The Commission being acutely aware of the adverse impact of upvaluation had dealt the issue in the conceptual paper for tariff setting. Asset valuation and its treatment as per Conceptual Issues of Electricity Tariff issued by OERC in August, 1998 in consultation with GRIDCO and with economists, industry association, power professionals and consumer groups are reproduced as below :-
“If the overall revenue requirements are to be set using accounting costs, then what measure of plant value should be included in the rate base component used in the determination.”

6.3.9

There are four possible measures of plant value for the calculation of the rate base viz. original cost less depreciation, reproduction or replacement cost less depreciation, the value assigned by the Government when it was transferred to GRIDCO and the certified values being produced by GRIDCO for privatization under the Companies Act. The Commission first encountered this issue in the last GRIDCO tariff proceeding when it had faced with a decision on whether to value GRIDCO's investment in plant at the original cost at the time the property was put in service or at the value assigned to the investment by the Government when it was transferred to GRIDCO. As new values are being developed for the four distribution entities, this issue will surely come up again as potential purchasers of the GRIDCO system consider the level of their offers.

6.3.10

While arguments can be made for the use of other measures of plant value for rate base, the Commission has no choice but to accept the plant values certified by Government for GRIDCO at the time of transfer of assets plus any prudent capital additions made by the licensees at original cost less depreciation. The value set by Government under the scheme to transfer assets from the erstwhile OSEB to GRIDCO formed the basis of the calculations in the last consideration and the Commission will continue to use the transfer value until it is demonstrated before it that regulatory principles or public interest requires a change to be made. Such changes will not be made lightly as the Commission places substantial weight on the principle of predictable and stable tariffs and tariff methods.

6.3.11

While GRIDCO agrees with the Commission that the total value of the zonal assets should not exceed the total value of the distribution assets as set out in the Transfer Scheme as adjusted for subsequent additions and depreciation, it may be worthwhile to use the revalued fair price of the assets to avail of short- and long-term loan from financial institutions. The latter will enhance creditworthiness of the licensee while tariff will be based on depreciated book value as set out in the Transfer scheme adjusted for subsequent addition & depreciation.”

6.3.12

In accordance with the policy guidelines set out in the conceptual issues, the Commission used the transfer values for the purpose of determination of tariff till 2000-01. But as stated earlier, the following projections as per SAR (Staff Appraisal Report) of the World Bank did not materialize viz.

• Projected load growth

• Reduction of transmission and distribution loss

• Efficiency in billing and collection

6.3.13

The Commission makes it abundantly clear that it proposes not to disturb the revaluation of the asset, which definitely enhances the creditworthiness of the licensee including the privatised distribution utilities. But the Commission has also to place substantial weight on the principle of predictable and stable tariff affordable by the consumers. It has, therefore, become imperative in the public interest to keep in abeyance the effect of the revaluation for the purpose of determination of tariff until the sector turns around.

6.3.14

Hence the Commission in exercise of its power under Section 11 of the OER Act, 1995 advises the Government to take necessary actions to make suitable amendment to the transfer notification issued by the Deptt. of Energy, Government of Orissa order dt.1.4.96 as mentioned in para 6.3 (a) and (b) so as to provide necessary support for the success of the power sector reform in Orissa.

6.4

Depreciation of Distcos

6.4.1

Government of India, Ministry of Power in their letter dt.01.6.99 addressed to the CMD, OHPC stated that the rates of depreciation as notified by the Central Government can only be a guiding factor and not be a binding factor on the Regulatory Commission. If the circumstance warrant CERC or SERC may, for the purpose of determination of tariff allow a different rate of depreciation. However, they will have to justify the same with reasons.

6.4.2

Further, it was clarified in the said letter that the power to determine the tariff includes the power to apply rate on depreciation and other concepts such as reasonable return. When Section 43A sub-section 2 is deleted, it will not be assumed that the Central Government looses power to fix depreciation principles for SEBs. It merely means that Central Government will have no authority to fix depreciation for the generating company selling power in SEB for the State.

6.4.3

As stated earlier, the objective of revaluation for GRIDCO that also included the distribution business was to help the sector to provide more self-financing for new investment with higher depreciation, which the owner could recover through tariff. The provisions of the Sixth Schedule of the Supply Act, 1948 para VI(a) states “The licensee shall provide each year for depreciation such sum calculated in accordance with the principles as the Central Government may, after consultation with the Authority, by notification in the Official Gazette, lay down from time to time”.

6.4.4

In the instant case, depreciation is being calculated at post’94 rate as prescribed by the Government of India on the asset base that was revalued on 01.4.96 which has substantially raised the revenue requirement of the transmission and distribution business. The Government of India notification on depreciation issued in pre-1992 links the rate of depreciation to the age of the asset. The Commission in the public interest decides that the licensees will be allowed to recover 90% of the asset value within the life period of the asset as determined in the Government of India notification of 1992. This will avoid front loading of the tariff, but at the same time will ensure necessary cash flow for the licensee over a longer period of time. Accordingly, the Commission directs that the depreciation of the assets should be limited to 90% of the revalued cost of the assets. The depreciation should be calculated from 01.04.2001 onwards after taking into account the extent of higher depreciation already recovered during 01.04.1996 to 31.3.2001 at pre-92 rate.

6.4.5

Securitisation of Power Purchase dues :In OERC Order No. Case No.29 & 30/2000 dtd.16.03.2001 on FRP and securitisation, the Commission observed in the concluding remarks “the Commission grants in principle approval of the Financial Restructuring Plan indicated in paras 12 and 13 of this order and plan for rescheduling of loans as contained in their application dtd.19.09.2000 vide Case No.30/2000 dtd.30.09.2000 and 29/2000 dtd.19.09.2000 respectively. GRIDCO with the support of GOO must plead with the GOI and the funding agencies for one time settlement, waiver of dues and fresh loans and after taking the results into account, implement the financial restructuring plan to revise GRIDCO so as to put it on recovery path towards viability”.

6.4.6

Further, the Commission has observed, “the retail tariff levels as proposed in the FRP is based on the BST calculation. The projection has not taken into account the debt service due to the tax free bonds to be issued by GRIDCO. On the other hand they have proposed additional borrowing to the tune of Rs.929 Crore in the year 2001 and further Rs.631 Crore in the year 2002. This will definitely impact the BST as well as the retail tariff thus upsetting some of the crucial FRP assumptions. We are not in a position to give clearance and commitment for future tariff, as these will be dealt separately on a year to year basis in accordance to the OER Act”.

6.4.7

A submission was made on behalf of GRIDCO during the course of the public hearing that GRIDCO has not been able to pay the dues to generators due to non-payment by the DISTCOs to GRIDCO. The power purchase payables as on 28 of February 2001 is given below :

Table : 5
(Rs. in Crore)

6.4.8

GRIDCO pleaded that NTPC has been regulating power supply to Orissa due to non-payment of dues and in accordance with the CERC order dt.11 January 2002 a utility will be required to bear the fixed cost of the generators in proportion to the share allocation during the period of energy regulation by the central generators. In this situation, the liability of GRIDCO will further increase if the Commission does not reconsider its own decision of not allowing the interests on account of securitization of power purchase liabilities. In view of the regulation of power by NTPC, it has become extremely urgent on the part of GRIDCO to create special purpose vehicle for securitizing power purchase liability of NTPC through issue of bonds and the Commission may permit the interest on bond as a pass through in the revenue requirement for the year 2001-02 and 2002-03. As indicated in para above, 6.4.5 the Commission being concerned about the mounting liabilities of GRIDCO accepts securitisation of current liabilities as on 28.2.2001 payable to CPSUs like NTPC and NALCO through issue of new bonds. In addition to this, the Commission also accepts the interest liability of the past bonds issued by GRIDCO which was earlier disallowed provided these bonds are converted in line with recommendation of Ahluwalia Committee.

6.4.9

The financial position of GRIDCO is such that the liability on account of power purchase is on the rise as already indicated earlier due to non-payment of BST bills by the distribution companies creating a debt trap both for GRIDCO as well as for the generators. At the time of passing of the FRP order indicated in para 6.4.5 above the issue of pass through of the burden of interest on power bonds on account of non-payment of power dues is required to be addressed in this tariff order. The Commission has come to a conscious decision that unless the power purchase liabilities are allowed to be securitised in full, the problem of liquidity cannot be addressed. In any case, this has to be a one time settlement in accordance with the policy followed at the national level where the GOI has very categorically accepted the ground realities and allowed securitisation of power dues as well as other dues payable to the GOI organisations by the SEBs. The case of Orissa is no different except that it has taken an advance step of reforming its own power sector for which SEB has been replaced by the GRIDCO and the DISTCOs. Accordingly, this principle should be applicable mutatis mutandis to GRIDCO which is purchasing bulk power from generators.

6.4.10

This will have the advantage of retiring high cost debts carrying surcharge as high as 24% per annum, (LPSC @ 2% p.m.) for the central generators. Securitisation of these dues will reduce the interest burden to 8.5% as recommended by the Ahluwalia Committee in its report for one time settlement for CPSU dues and accepted by the Government of India. The Commission would further expect that the dues of CPSUs like NALCO should also be securitised by GRIDCO in a similar manner.

6.4.11

As far as the recovery of interest from DISTCOs is concerned, the analogy as applied for GRIDCO shall apply in this case, since there is a back to back arrangement between GRIDCO and DISTCOs for recovery of the institutional loans handed over at the time of separation of distribution business from GRIDCO. Interest shall be calculated during the year 2002-03 on the loans and pass bonds securatized carrying a lower rate of interest of 8.5%.

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