4.0
|
OBJECTIONS DURING HEARING The Commission
admitted twenty-four objections against Retail Supply Tariff application, 2001-02 and
seven objections against the Revenue Requirement application, 2002-03 for personal
hearing. Some of the objections were of general nature and others were specific to the
tariff filing of 2001-02 and Revenue Requirement of the licensee for 2002-03. Summary of
these objections based on issues raised are presented below: |
4.1
|
Validity and Frequency of Retail Tariff Application Some
objectors suggested that the tariff application of the licensee is not maintainable and
tariff once fixed should not be revised within a financial year. |
4.2
|
Classification of Consumers Some objectors
stated that the tariff application of CESCO had no legal base as the classification of
consumers to which the tariff was to be made applicable was not done by the DISTCOs nor
was approved by the Commission. |
4.3
|
Audited Accounts Most
objectors stated that the licensee has submitted its financial statements based on
provisional accounts, which should not be accepted by the Commission. They suggested that
the audited accounts for the FY 1998-99, 1999-00 and 2000-01 should be submitted to the
Commission as early as possible. |
4.4
|
Sales Mix and Demand Estimation
Some objectors maintained that consumption, contract demand
and the number of consumers did not appear to have any relationship meaning thereby that
the data submitted by CESCO were erroneous. |
4.5
|
Unreliable Nature of T&D Loss
Figures
The licensee has not given any basis of measuring T&D Loss
either in its entirety or at different voltage levels. The loss was computed taking into
account even the zero loss EHT energy input into the system. Some objectors commented that
when a large chunk of consumers were unmetered or possessing defective meters, the
declared loss levels by the licensee could not be accurate. Further, it was stated by the
objectors that the losses projected by the licensee were mostly different from those
projected by World Bank. It was widely felt by the objectors that a pilot study be
conducted with full fledged metering based on sample survey so that reliable estimate of
loss levels could be obtained. |
4.6
|
Major Expenses of the Licensee
All expenses of CESCO were projected at a higher
level and therefore needed to be scrutinised. Some objectors maintained
that the Orissa’s power cost should have been one of the lowest
considering the large-scale availability of hydropower and most thermal
stations were pithead ones. The cost of employees, material cost and
A&G expenses were excessive and the same should be pruned as per OERC
norms. The expenses for consultants were also excessive. R&M expenses
should be limited to 2.5% of fixed assets. Legal expenses need to be
curtailed and CESCO should not be engaged in frivolous litigation. |
4.7
|
High Transmission and Distribution
Losses
There were strong objections to high T&D losses
assumed by the licensee for calculating its revenue requirements for
2001-02 and 2002-03. It was disappointing that Distribution Loss after six
years of reform was still at 47%. The objectors maintained that CESCO’s
loss estimation was not accurate as most consumers did not have meters or
had defective meters. Therefore, OERC should not allow the total loss to
exceed 32% out of which transmission loss should be 3.5% and distribution
loss 29.53% for FY 02. |
4.8
|
Provision for Bad Debts
Bad debt should not be allowed unless CESCO makes efforts to collect
arrears. OERC should only make a token provision for bad debt. Allowing 15% of incremental
arrears as bad debt is a premium for inefficiency. |
4.9
|
Load Factor Billing
The objectors stated that the licensee has not followed the
directions of OERC on many matters including installation of meters and correction of
defective meters. Hence load factor billing should not be continued indefinitely and the
same should brought down to 10% in case of domestic category. |
4.10
|
Multi-Year Tariff
Some objectors pleaded for a multi-year tariff for industrial
consumers, which should be fixed for a period of five years with provision for variation
due to power procurement cost. |
4.11
|
Interest on Loan
Interest payable to revenue was projected at higher level. Interest
may be maintained at the level allowed by OERC. |
4.12
|
Reasonable Return
Reasonable return at a flat rate of 16% not allowable. |
4.13
|
Depreciation
Depreciation may be allowed only after an asset register is formed.
Depreciation should not be allowed on assets reaching their salvage value. Further
Depreciation may be calculated on the basis of the 1994 GOI Notification for assets
created after March, 1994. Earlier norms relating to Depreciation should apply to older
assets. |
4.14
|
Provision for Previous Losses
Some objectors stated that OERC should not allow any provision for
previous loss. In fact, previous loss is not chargeable to tariff, they maintained. |
4.15
|
Penalty for Excess Drawal
Drawal of power on account of excessive loss over and above
permitted by OERC should be borne by CESCO. |
4.16
|
Concessional Tariff for Industries
Industry bodies pleaded for a multi-year concessional tariff for
industry. They said that inadequate HT and EHT load growth in the state indicated that
there was something wrong with industrial tariff. Other objectors argued against such
concessional tariff for industry. |
4.17
|
Security Deposit
In case of large industries, the security deposits should be
reduced to only one month average billing instead of prevailing two months average
billing. |
4.18
|
Capital Base
Irrespective of the purchase value of the assets, the
“original cost of the fixed assets” shall be the depreciated book
value going by the Sixth Schedule. |
4.19
|
Demand Charge
The levy of demand charge and the monthly minimum charge on a
connected load upto 100 KVA is unreasonable and is against the interest of the small-scale
industries. |
4.20
|
Meter Rent
Some objectors stated that the meter rent charged was high and the
consumers were not allowed to purchase their own meters. |
4.21
|
Reduction of BST
Some objectors suggested that a reduction in BST could be helpful
in reducing retail tariff. They provided alternative calculations of a lower retail tariff
based on assumptions of a lower BST. |
4.22
|
Power Factor Incentive
Since power factor penalty is levied for power factor of less than
90%, a power factor incentive should be given for power factors above 90% at the same
rate. |
4.23
|
Interruption, Low Voltage and
Unreliable Supply
Most objectors complained of interruption in supply, low voltage,
unreliable supply and supply of power for a few hours in certain areas. |
4.24
|
Unauthorised and Illegal Abstraction
of Electricity
Unauthorised and illegal abstraction of electricity has resulted in
higher tariff for the honest consumers. Therefore power theft should be stopped abruptly. |
4.25
|
Rural Electrification Work
If the rural electrification is to be carried out by separate
agencies, then the revenue requirement on account of such electrification should be
treated separately. |
4.26
|
Time Overrun of PMU Work
The objectors felt that there was time overrun of PMU work leading
to non-realisation of the benefits of such projects by the consumers in time. |
4.27
|
NALCO Tariff
Instead of a tariff of 450 paise per unit for emergency supply to
Nalco, a tariff of three times the energy charge Nalco gets from GRIDCO against its export
should be maintained. Further, wheeling of power from CPP, Angul may be permitted for
Nalco Bhawan and Nalco Nagar Township at Bhubaneswar. |
4.28
|
Power Factor Penalty
Mahanadi Coal Fields Ltd. pleaded for a low power factor penalty
instead of the prevailing one. |
4.29
|
Serving of Bills
Some objectors stated that bills were not served in time depriving
them of the rebate facility |
4.30
|
Reconnection Charges
The proposed hike in reconnection charges was excessive. |
4.31
|
Uniform RST Across Zones The
objectors agreed for a uniform RST across zones, which could be achieved by varying BST. |
4.32
|
Surcharge on Over-Dues
Surcharge on over-dues payable to GRIDCO due to inefficiencies of
CESCO should not be allowed. |
4.33
|
Tariff and Inflation
Most objectors felt that tariff proposed by CESCO was contrary to
the general level of inflation prevailing in the country. |
4.44
|
Ability to Pay of Consumers
Capacity to pay of the consumers is not taken into consideration
for fixation of tariff. Industries for example cannot be asked to pay tariff beyond
sustainable level. |
4.45
|
CLARIFICATION SOUGHT BY DIRECTOR (TARIFF), OERC
CESCO in its revenue requirement application for FY 2002-03 has
proposed distribution loss at 43% whereas for the same year in its business plan it has
shown the same at 39.35%. Similarly for FY 2001-02 in the tariff application, distribution
loss is proposed at 44% but in the business plan, it is shown at 40.94%. Justification for
this discrepancy may be provided.
In the RST proposal for 2001-02 the distribution loss is shown at 44%
whereas the same for the year 2001-02 in the ARR application of 2002-03 is shown at 45%.
This may be justified.
In the form T-7 (expected revenue from existing tariff) and T-8
(tariff provision proposal) rebate has been taken for 100% of consumption. This may be
justified.
Audited accounts for the year 1998-99, 1999-00 and 2000-01 have not
been submitted.
CESCO has proposed Rs.298.97 crore in 2001-02 and Rs.560.59 crore in
2002-03 of previous losses to be passed on to consumers under special appropriation. How
would the licensee justify the amounts without audited accounts?
As per the provisions of para IV of the Sixth Schedule to the
Electricity Supply Act, 1948 the licensee shall have to appropriate specified sum out of
the revenue to contingencies reserve every year. CESCO in its revenue requirement for the
year 2001-02 has not proposed any amount. The contingency reserve is created for specified
purpose. CESCO may clarify the reasons for not claiming the same.
In the Form F-17 of ARR 2002-03 it is found that as on 31.03.2002
receivables from consumers is estimated at Rs1048.47 crore and as on 31.03.2003 the same
is estimated at Rs.1210.83 crore as against the billing of 624.76 crore for the year
2001-02 and 737.98 crore for the FY 2002-03. It means 610 days of sales for the year
2001-02 and 596 days for the year 2002-03 are in the receivables, which are to be
collected from the consumers. Why the licensee should be allowed DPS of Rs.97.62 crore for
2001-02 and 140.40 crore for 2002-03 on power purchase liability while they are unable to
collect the huge arrears from the consumers.
Average rate as indicated in the Format T-6 for last 7 months has
been calculated at Rs.3.05 per unit for FY 2001-02. But in the Format T-7 (calculation of
expected revenue) it has been indicated at Rs.2.76 per unit. This huge difference in the
average rate shows much less revenue and does not appear to be correct. This may be
explained.
There is a gap in the revenue requirements and expected revenue for
the FY 2002-03. How does the licensee plan to bridge the gap?
|